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INTRODUCTION 
Money, we make it 
Fore we see it you take it 
Oh, make you wanna holler 
The way they do my life 
Make me wanna holler 
The way they do my life 
This ain't livin' 
This ain't livin' 
No, no baby, this ain't livin' 
No, no, no1 
 
Called a “protest anthem” for urban America, Inner City Blues, the final single from 
R&B artist Marvin Gaye’s award-wining album What’s Going On, documents American 
urban life by detailing the systemic barriers to economic independence and social equality 
that plagued urban residents and the impact of these barriers on their daily lives. The song 
(and album) were released in 1971 as Gaye’s journalistic exploration of the poverty-
induced challenges and frustrations of urban life. Almost fifty years later, unfortunately, 
not much has changed.  This is because the operation of law in urban communities 
historically not been designed to work for the benefit of poor urban residents but, 
instead, for the benefit of other interests, such as private developers and business 
interests. Why? Because urban residents are frequently viewed as the “problem” 
of the urban core. America has attempted to “fix the problems” of its cities since cities 
first began appearing on the American landscape a couple of hundred years before the 
release of What’s Going On.   
Rightly or wrongly, any list of urban problems will typically include challenges 
such as traffic congestion, crime, gang violence, underperforming public schools, and high 
rates of poverty. State and local governments have implemented an assortment of 
programs, including development tax incentives such as tax increment financing, to cure 
these problems.2 The majority of these initiatives, however, rarely are designed to meet the 
actual challenges endured by poor urban residents.3 Instead, these programs focus on 
creating enticements to lure a new “type” of urban resident—one who is not poor. 4 In other 
words, the “fixes” are designed to displace poor black urban residents instead of engaging 
directly with the source of the problems.5 As such, proposed fixes have been largely 
mismatched to the problems in the urban core. 6 For example, disparities in educational 
opportunities, limited access to quality affordable housing and healthcare, high 
unemployment rates, and the biased execution of policing practices are urban realities that 
                                                        
1  MARVIN GAYE, Inner City Blues (Make Me Wanna Holler), on WHAT’S GOING ON? (Motown Records 
1971). 
2 See Audrey McFarlane, Redevelopment and the Four Dimensions of Class in Land Use, 22 J. L. & POL. 
33 (2006). 
3 Id. at 45. 
4 Id. at 33. 
5 Interview by Kenneth Clark of James Baldwin (1963) (available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8Abhj17kYU) (describing urban renewal programs as “Negro 
removal”).  
6 Id. at 45. 
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cannot be cured by the construction of new highways, sports stadiums, luxury high-rise 
apartments and condos, or the opening of craft breweries.7 This ongoing mismatch of 
strategy to “perceived problem” calls  for  reimagining the application of law in the urban 
core to address the urgency of poverty.   
The origins of the mismatch lie in the industrialization and urbanization of 
America. During WWI, African American migrants began moving from the 
oppressive Jim Crow laws in the South to the rapidly industrializing cities in the 
North and other parts of the country for jobs and some sense of personal safety, 
dramatically changing the demographics of their destination cities.8 In many 
instances these migrants traded the formal segregationist laws of the South for 
informal, but, in many ways equally destructive discriminatory practices in other 
areas of the country. Given the limited opportunities for African Americans to 
build and accumulate wealth in the South, many of the migrants arriving in these 
other states were quite poor.9 Even those with the financial means to move were 
confined to these urban spaces by discriminatory practices such as racial covenants 
and redlining.10 As a result, poverty and urbanized life became racialized 
concepts—equating urban life with African American culture and poverty.11 This 
notion became compounded as poor African Americans were displaced from their 
neighborhoods and concentrated into high rise public housing projects to 
accommodate urban renewal projects12 As such, African Americans became the 
urban “problem” to be fixed and many approaches to the operation of law in the 
urban core are inappropriately designed around this flawed notion and, as a result, 
fail.13  
The urban core, of course, has never only been inhabited by African Americans. 
The urban core has and continues to be home for diverse communities, including many 
low-income whites and immigrants.14 The growth of immigrant communities in the urban 
core has reinforced the perception that the urban core is a place defined by poor people of 
color. When the problems of the urban core became synonymous with the characteristics 
of the poor people living in the urban core, displacement of urban residents through 
redevelopment became a strategy for curing “urban blight.”15 To effectuate lasting social 
change in the urban core, the role of law must address the causes of the urban 
problems—instead of interacting with poor urban residents as if they are the 
problem. This essay offers a non-litigation alternative for disrupting the practice of 
mismatched urban development policies while making meaningful social change in the 
                                                        
7 See generally id. 
8 See, e.g., THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR 
DETROIT 23–24, 33–34 (2005) The date range for the Great Migration is typically reported as from 1910-
1970. However, that date range has been divided into two segments: 1910-1930 and 1940-1970. 
9 Id. at 24. 
10 See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).  
11 Id. at 56. 
12 Id. at 55–56. 
13 Id. at 56. 
14 See Faye Hipsman & Doris Meissner, Immigration in the United States: New Economic, Social, Political 
Landscapes with Legislative Reform on the Horizon, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 16, 2013), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-united-states-new-economic-social-political-
landscapes-legislative-reform. 
15 Id. at 56. 
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urban core and throughout a metropolitan region: impact transaction through the relational 
contracts of collective impact initiatives.      
While urban communities each have their own unique geographic footprint, there 
are certain common challenges that poor urban residents face as a consequence of systemic 
race and class discrimination in areas such as affordable housing, healthcare, the 
application of criminal justice, access to fair lending practices, and equitably resourced 
public education. Legal recourse to these forms of systemic injustice typically is addressed 
through impact litigation.16 Impact litigation is a powerful legal tool traditionally 
associated with public interest or social change lawyering in the pursuit of large scale social 
change through class action law suits.17 These law suits have been brought to bar housing 
discrimination, segregation in public schools, discrimination in hiring, and myriad other 
discriminatory practices. While these law suits brought significant victories that secured 
important rights though the creation of new laws, the suits did not eradicate the 
discriminatory behavior in actual practice. For example, despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision to desegregate public schools, school segregation remains a significant challenge 
for the majority of students in America’s public schools. 18 Thus, reexamination of the 
application of law in the urban core is critical, and transactional law is an effective lens for 
this reexamination.   
Transactional law is centered on value creation, and transactional practice seeks to 
create value for all of the parties to a transaction.19 It does this by being a forward-looking 
practice designed to effectuate parties’ common goals while simultaneously identifying 
and accounting for preventative mechanisms to prevent disharmony among the parties.20 
Unlike impact litigation, impact transaction is not the pursuit of social change through 
judicial adjudication.21  Instead, impact transaction is “a transactional, non-litigation 
strategy for social change”22—a social change strategy based on voluntary actions and 
agreements among parties interested in pursuing large-scale social change.23 Impact 
litigation successes have occurred through a range of methodologies and strategies.24 Like 
impact litigation, impact transaction can materialize through different methodologies.25 
Collective impact is an impact transaction strategy.26   
Collective impact is an emerging framework for large-scale social change.27 As a 
“commitment of a group of important actors from different sectors to a common agenda 
for solving a specific social problem,”28  collective impact is not just a new term “for 
collaboration, but [it] represents a fundamentally different, more disciplined, and higher-
                                                        
16 See, e.g., ALAN CHEN & SCOTT CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE 624 (2012). 
17  See generally id. 
18 See infra notes 32 – 36 and accompanying text.   
19 ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERING PRACTICE 4 
(2013). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 5. 
22 Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective Impact 
Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 623 (2016).   
23 See Id.  
24 Id. at 625. 
25 Id. at 628. 
26 Id. at 633. 
27 Id. 
28 John Kania et al., Essential Mindset Shifts for Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 2, 2 
(2014). 
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performing approach to achieving large-scale social impact.”29  Reflective of transactional 
practice, collective impact seeks to create value for all of the various parties involved in a 
given initiative using means that do not involve litigation, but a social action deal-making 
strategy. It is a more engaged method of collaboration with its defining features being “a 
centralized infrastructure, a dedicated staff, and a structured process”30 but with no formal 
contracting process. Much of the value generated through transaction, however, is through 
contract. While entities may be parties to contracts, people operate entities and their 
relationships with others drive deals and other transactions.  There’s a name for that:  
relational contract theory. This essay presents collective impact initiatives as relational 
contracts and explains why the practice of collective impact needs a written form 
agreement that reflects relational contract principles to enhance the collective impact 
framework and facilitate impact transaction to address urban poverty.        
 
I. Exploring Impact Transaction as a Tool for Large-Scale Social Change 
 
 Many lawyers dedicate their careers to using the rule of law to secure systemic 
relief for subordinated and marginalized individuals and communities. Impact transaction 
emerges from this tradition, as an additional strategic tool for the social advocacy toolbox 
– presented here as a framework for changing interrupting the cycle of urban poverty.      
 Impact litigation is the legal tool traditionally associated with public interest or 
social change lawyering seeking large scale social change in areas such as housing, public 
education, and health care. Impact litigation is “[p]lanning, preparing, and filing or 
defending law suits focused on changing laws or the rights of specific groups of people.”31 
Even if only one individual is involved in the litigation, impact litigation is judicial 
adjudication of cases that have the potential to impact conditions broadly for many 
similarly-situated people or to highlight a particular issue. To pursue impact litigation, 
advocates employ legal strategies to vindicate rights and address injustice through judicial 
opinion, while, in turn, hoping that such judicial opinions would promote more expansive 
legal and social changes through legislative action. Impact transaction is not offered as a 
replacement of impact litigation as a tool for social change, but as a complementary 
strategy. Like impact litigation, impact transaction is a legal strategy for social change.  
Impact transaction, however, is not a strategy seeking a judicial remedy. Courts facilitate 
impact litigation, whereas impact transaction is facilitated by voluntary acts among parties 
seeking to achieve a social outcome through transactional means, such as an agreement.    
 While this essay does not purport to replace impact litigation as a strategy for social 
change, it does assert that there are two scenarios where transaction is the preferred 
approach to problem-solving. First, where impact litigation has pushed an issue as far is it 
can go through the judicial system, but without producing a framework for implementing 
the social change sought. For example, one of the most renowned instances of a successful 
impact litigation strategies is the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People’s (NAACP) campaign to abolish segregation in public education by bringing Brown 
                                                        
29 Fay Hanleybrown et al., Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work, Stan. Soc. Innovation 
Rev, 1, 2 (2012).  
30 John Kania & Mark Kramer, Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 36, 38 (2011). 
 
31Litigation: Impact, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-
law/public-interest-work-types/impact-litigation/ (last visited March 14, 2019). 
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v. Board of Education.32 Brown was decided in 1954 and despite its calling for the 
desegregation of America’s public schools, the majority of students in our public school 
system today attend segregated schools in 2019.33 This is because the Court’s decision left 
the implementation of desegregation to the states, and many, if not the majority of states 
with segregated public school systems failed to implement any meaningful strategies for 
desegregation.34 Thus, a judicial win, while crucially important, does not always guarantee 
an actual sustainable social change outcome.35 Impact transaction is an alternative to 
impact litigation as a tool for large-scale social change where a social justice outcome is 
predicated upon an infrastructure for implementation that cannot be achieved by a judicial 
decision, but may be achieved through a transactional strategy, such as agreement through 
relational contract.36         
The second scenario occurs where impact litigation is ill-equipped, as a practical 
matter, to achieve social change because of its focus on securing individual rights. Impact 
litigation pursues large-scale social change through class action law suits, however, the 
effects of the law suit are not limited to the members of the class. For example, one of the 
most recent examples of an impact litigation case, Obergefell v. Hodges, legalized same 
sex marriage throughout the United States for all citizens—not just those participating in 
the lawsuit.37 Unlike impact litigation, impact transaction is not triggered by infringement 
on an individual’s rights or the commission of an actionable harm. Impact transaction is a 
strategy to address a social ill where the eradication of that ill is not intended to produce 
new legal rights for individuals that fit a class but, instead, systemic change. However, 
again, this essay does not question the import of impact litigation.  Instead, it offers impact 
transaction as a complementary non-litigation strategy for pursuing social change in the 
urban core.   
Social change advocates understand that there is a distinction between “equality” 
and “equity.”38 Equality ensures that everyone can participate in the same process and that 
the process, itself, does not bar certain groups of people from participation.39 Equity, 
however, understands that everyone needs access to the same opportunities while 
recognizing that “access” is a dynamic concept that must change in accordance with 
individual circumstances and needs.40 Impact litigation is designed to pursue equality, 
impact transaction, on the other hand is designed to promote equity. Both, of course, are 
important strategies for social change through legal reform. Conceptually, these two 
strategies share the same goal of effectuating large-scale social change. The question 
explored in this essay is how to do that through written agreement, and, more specifically, 
whether relational contract theory can inform the construction of a framework for 
collective impact agreements to facilitate impact transaction. In addition to outlining the 
                                                        
32See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
33 See, e.g., Kristina Rizga, A Witness to the Desegregation-and Resegregation- of America’s Schools,  
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/05/on-teaching-rebecca-
palacios/559322/ (discussing segregation in Corpus Christie schools). 
34 See, e.g., Sarah Garland, Was ‘Brown v. Board’ a Failure?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/was-brown-v-board-a-failure/265939/. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
37 See 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
38 See Vu Le, Why Equality Is Actively Harmful to Equity, NONPROFIT AF (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://nonprofitaf.com/2015/11/why-equality-is-actively-harmful-to-equity/. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 
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collective impact framework, the next section presents examples of current collective 
impact initiatives and explains their potential for impact transaction.       
 
II. The Collective Impact Infrastructure and Framework 
Originating in the philanthropic community, the collective impact framework holds 
potential for promoting and sustaining impact transaction. Collective impact initiatives run 
the gamut of transactional activities across the globe41, including affordable housing 
development, economic development and workforce development, K-12 education, and 
health and nutrition.42 For example, the Opportunity Chicago collective impact initiative 
organized around the common agenda of helping public housing residents find, train for, 
and obtain quality jobs.43 The Road Map Project collective impact initiative works to close 
the K-12 achievement gap in Seattle, Washington.44 And, the Fresno Food Security 
Network collective impact initiative is focused on eliminating food insecurity.45 These 
three collective impact initiatives work to improve the conditions of affordable housing, 
equity in public education, and community health outcome through nutrition through non-
litigation, transactional collaborative arrangements —all examples of systemic change 
through impact transaction. The success of each of these initiatives is linked to the 
participants’ incorporation of and adherence to the collective impact structure outlined 
below.   
The collective impact framework is built around the following five hallmarks:  (1) 
a common agenda; (2) shared measurement; (3) mutually reinforcing activities; (4) 
continuous communication among the parties; (5) and the implementation of backbone 
support organizations.46 First, fundamental to the framework, all parties to collective 
impact initiatives must agree on a common agenda that reflects “a common understanding 
of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed upon actions.”47 The 
desired outcome of the common agenda is what brings the parties to the collective impact 
in the first place.48 Second, the parties must agree to a methodology of shared measurement 
for data collection that provides a framework for measuring and reporting the initiative’s 
successes and failures, while acting as a check to keep the individual efforts of each 
member of the initiative aligned with the common agenda.49 Third, each party must 
contribute distinct, but mutually reinforcing, activities to advance the initiative and avoid 
                                                        
41 In addition to the United States, collective impact initiatives are ongoing in Canada and Australia.   
For Canada see Collective Impact, TAMARACK INST., http://www.tamarackcommunity.ca/collectiveimpact 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). For Australia see Collective Impact, SOC. OUTCOMES, 
https://socialoutcomes.com.au/toolkit/collective-impact/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
42  See generally Initiative Directory, COLLECTIVE IMPACT F., 
https://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/initiatives (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
43 See generally FSG, COLLECTIVE IMPACT CASE STUDY: OPPORTUNITY CHICAGO (2012) (available at 
https://www.fsg.org/publications/opportunity-chicago). 
44 About the Road Map Project, ROAD MAP PROJECT, https://roadmapproject.org/about-the-road-map-
project/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
45 See generally GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOOD TO SHARE 
AS A HEALTHY COMMUNITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASE STUDY (2018) (available at 
http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/20180305-FoodToShare-Case-Study.pdf). 
46 See Kania et. al, supra note 28, at 2. 
47 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 39.  
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 40. 
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duplication of the services contributed to the collective impact.50 Fourth, members of 
collective impact initiatives must participate in ongoing communication systems, which 
may include the creation of a common vocabulary and other mechanisms to ensure that all 
of the parties are continuously working towards the common agenda.51 Continuous 
communication reinforces levels of trust among the participants, which is essential to the 
initiative’s success.52 Lastly, and arguably, most essentially, collective impact initiatives 
are managed by backbone agencies that are supposed to ensure the other four hallmarks 
are being advanced within a collective impact initiative.53 Backbone agencies are the 
project managers who manage the daily functions of their initiatives by working with a 
collective impact network to “build consensus around a common goal, agree on how 
progress will be measured, and coordinate activities to maximize results.”54  Backbone 
agencies do not directly provide any program-related services to a collective impact 
network,55 but, instead, focus “on the relationships between organizations and the progress 
toward shared objectives”56 by coordinating the activities of the other stakeholders in the 
collective impact network.57 The success of collective impact initiatives is linked to the 
effectiveness of the backbone agency, and ineffective backbone support is the number one 
reason collective impact initiatives fail.58           
It is not only the structured framework that distinguishes collective impact from 
other collaborative processes. Two other unique characteristics of collective impact 
initiatives are (i)the diverse range of parties in each collective impact networks, and (ii) the 
expectation that each specific party is supposed to contribute a very distinct role.59 
Collective impact rosters typically include one or more backbone agencies; one or more 
funders to provide technical or financial support; a collective impact consultant; and an 
assortment of organizational members.60  A collective impact initiative may consist of 
organizational members such as universities, nonprofit organizations, government and 
public agencies, and business interests.61 Once the network roster is finalized, the members 
are assigned to participate on steering committees and/or thematic working groups.62 Each 
member is expected to provide “specialized assistance and resources specific to their 
ability.”63 For example, “[b]usiness organizations are taking on strong roles [in collective 
impact initiatives] . . . serving as a founding partner or backbone organization, to represent 
                                                        
50 See id. 
51 See id.   
52 See id.  
53 See id. 
54 Kara Bixby, LINKEDIN (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/in/kara-bixby-19483288. 
55 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 40. 
56 See id.at 39. 
57 See id. at 40. 
58 See generally Shiloh Turner et al., Understanding the Value of Backbone Organizations in Collective 
Impact: Part 3, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jul 19, 2012), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/understanding_the_value_of_backbone_organizations_in_collective_impact_3
. 
59 Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 39. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 40. 
62 Id. 
63 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, RESERVE BANK COLLABORATION IN RURAL AREAS THROUGH 
THE COLLECTIVE IMPACT MODEL (2015), https://www.richmondfed.org/-
/media/richmondfedorg/publications/community_development/marketwise_community/2015/issue_1/pdf/v
ol5_issue1.pdf.   
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the collective voice of the business community.”64 The collective impact framework also 
sets expectations for the level of involvement from each participant by requiring 
representatives of each network members to reflect organizational leadership, such as 
university presidents, school district superintendents, and business, nonprofit, and 
government officers. These requirements for diversity in organizational membership and 
the commitment of organizational leaders should be viewed as indirect tools for enhancing 
equity through collective impact by demonstrating a replicable model for inclusive design, 
thinking, and planning in the public’s interest. These are the sorts of mechanisms that will 
facilitate impact transaction.       
So, why would collective impact initiatives work where other types of initiatives 
have failed? Why aren’t collective impact initiatives another proposed mismatch for 
addressing urban poverty? The answer is because collective impact’s influence  is not 
limited to the production of a new form of collaboration but also has generated  several 
paradigm shifts within the ideologies of philanthropic and social advocacy networks.65 The 
most significant of these paradigm shifts is a more deliberative approach to identifying and 
working to solve “adaptive” social problems instead of focusing on “technical” social 
problems.66 Adaptive problems are complex problems with unknown or yet to be 
discovered answers and, even if an answer is identified, for which no single entity “has the 
resources or authority to bring about the necessary change.”67 Urban poverty, for example, 
is an adaptive problem, because, despite decades  of effort, there is no singular quantifiable 
“fix” or “cure” for urban poverty.68 Urban poverty is not a social problem that can be 
managed by a single organization. Technical social problems, in contrast, are well defined 
and capable of being managed by a single organization.69 A shelter that provides temporary 
housing to women and children escaping domestic violence demonstrates the management 
of a technical problem, an important and fixed intervention in individual family crises. The 
adaptive iteration of that example would focus on the systemic issues and social norms that 
contribute to incidents of domestic violence. Technical social problems are single-
dimensional, causing them to be ill-suited for collective impact initiatives. Collective 
impact is, instead, designed for multidimensional problem solving, where there is a breadth 
of issues and the different perspectives on those issues held by a diverse group of 
stakeholders.70 With this paradigm shift, collective impact initiatives avoid making isolated 
impacts in social problems because “[b]y their very nature, individual nonprofit services 
are fragmented and dispersed, with each organization typically serving a limited population 
with specific interventions.”71      
                                                        
64 Collective Impact for Education and Workforce Development, ASS’N CHAMBER COM. EXECUTIVES, 
http://www.acce.org/wiki/collective-impact-for-education-and-workforce-development/ (last visited Apr. 3, 
2019) (discussing the increasing role of chambers of commerce as backbone support organizations in 
collective impact initiatives). 
65 Kania & Kamer, supra note 30, at 39. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Practitioner Insights: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM, 
http://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/resources/practitioner-insights-federal-reserve-bank-san-francisco 
69 See id.  
70 See, e.g., Leonard J. Marcus et al., The Walk in the Woods: A Step-by-Step Method for Facilitating 
Interest-Based Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 28 NEGOT. J. 337, 339–40 (2012). 
71 See generally Kania et al., supra note 28. Michele Jolin et al., Needle-Moving Community 
Collaboratives: A Promising Approach to Addressing America’s Biggest Challenges, BRIDGESPAN GROUP 
1, 2 (2012), https://www.bridgespan.org/bridgespan/Images/articles/needle-moving-community-
collaboratives/needle-moving-community-collaboratives.pdf?ext=.pdf.  
Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice    [Vol. 8:1 2019] 
 
10 
  Despite its potential, like with any emerging movement, collective impact has to 
overcome challenges to its structure and implementation. In the context of confronting 
urban poverty, there are two significant challenges to the sustained effectiveness of 
collective impact as impact transaction: (i) the need for collective impact to develop a 
deeper engagement with principles of equity and inclusivity, and (ii) the need for the 
construction of a framework for working with written agreements.72   
It is important for the collective impact framework to explicitly reflect principles 
of equity so that an equity framework is in place at the founding of a collective impact 
initiative.73    Fair critiques of the collective impact framework argue that collective impact 
initiatives rely on a “grasstops”74 orientation instead of promoting “grassroots” organizing, 
which leads to critiques that collective impact initiatives make decisions about the 
communities in which they are attempting to promote large-social change without first 
meaningfully engaging that community.75 That would be a waste that can be thoughtfully 
avoided.  Advocates of equity and inclusivity who see the potential of collective impact 
have started the work of developing an equity lens for collective impact initiatives,76 as 
well as formulating strategies for ensuring that equity principles are built into the collective 
impact framework at the initial planning phases.77 Understanding “‘context’ . . . [as] a 
broad concept best perceived comprehensively,” 78 relationists argue that “[c]ontract law, 
which orders bargaining relationships and transactions, should always be tempered by the 
facts of particular contexts.”79 “Context is the substance of the deal, the circumstances 
under which the deal was made, the course of dealing between the parties, the industry(ies) 
in which the parties operate, and ‘the asymmetrical information or power disparities’80 
present in the transaction.” But, in collective impact agreements, context could and should 
be broader. “The lack of acknowledgment of cultural, class, and racial factors in the 
interpretation and enforcement of contracts—bias and discrimination issues aside—relates 
partially to contract law’s egalitarian underpinnings.”81 Impact transaction can occur 
through collective impact initiatives executed through written relational contracts that 
reflect principles of equity.   
The second significant challenge to the long-term success of collective impact is 
the lack of any sort of formalized contracting process for collective impact agreements. 
Members of collective impact initiatives “agree to agree,” while participating in numerous 
                                                        
72 See, e.g., Michael McAfee et al., Equity: The Soul of Collective Impact, POLICYLINK 1, 3, 
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/Collective_Impact_10-21-15f_0.pdf. 
73 See, e.g., Sarah Stachowiak & Lauren Gase, Does Collective Impact Really Make and Impact?, STAN. 
SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/does_collective_impact_really_make_an_impact.  
74 See Melody Barnes et al., Roundtable on Community Engagement and Collective Impact in Collective 
Insights on Collective Impact, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 12, 14 (2014). 
75 See id. 
76 See generally Seeing Collective Impact Efforts with a Racial Justice Lens, INTERACTION INST. FOR SOC. 
CHANGE (June 7, 2017), http://interactioninstitute.org/seeing-collective-impact-efforts-with-a-racial-
justice-lens/. 
77 See, e.g., Juan Sebastian Arias & Sherl Brady, 3 Steps for Advancing Equity through Collective Impact, 
COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM (Apr. 15, 2015), http://collectiveimpactforum.org/blogs/11421/3-steps-
advancing-equity-through-collective-impact. 
78 Id. at 662. 
79 Id. at 662 (citing Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and Contracts as Context, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 561 (2010)).  
80 Arias & Brady, supra note 77, at 662 (citing DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 79, at 557). 
81 Id. at 658 (citing DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 79, at 569). 
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planning processes to build trust and work toward a common agenda.82 The complexity of 
attempting to solve adaptive problems through the efforts of multiple and distinct parties 
necessitates a more formalized collective impact agreement to ensure that all parties’ 
expectations are memorialized, increasing the likelihood that those expectations will be 
met.83 A typical bank finance transaction presents an interesting conceptual analog for 
demonstrating the value of written agreements. For example, when a bank syndicate makes 
a loan to a borrower, the relationship among the various banks and the borrower is governed 
by a credit agreement or some other type of loan agreement. That credit agreement 
documents each of the party’s obligations, including the total loan amount, the amount of 
each individual bank’s participation in the loan, the conditions precedent to closing the 
loan, the rate of interest applied to the loan, the loan term, affirmative covenants (things 
the borrower must do to stay in compliance with the agreement), negative covenants (things 
the borrower should not do while under the agreement), events of default (things the 
borrower might do to default under the agreement), the various representations and 
warranties that the borrower must make about its capacity to participate in and repay the 
loan, the required steps the borrower must draw from the loan, and the obligations of each 
of the lenders to participate in the loan. This transaction, and similar transactions, are 
accomplished using a myriad of form agreements that have been proven for the type of 
transaction and, ideally, tailored for the particular transaction.84 While loan agreements are 
a markedly different type of transaction from collective impact initiatives, they operate 
under a similar structure of relationship but without any form agreement frameworks.85 
Loan agreements are shaped and governed by contract law. As explained below, collective 
impact initiatives should be shaped and governed by relational contract theory because 
collective impact agreements drafted using relational contract principles could be the 
appropriate match for confronting poverty in the urban core as impact transaction. 
 
III. Impact Transaction in The Urban Core Through Collective Impact 
Initiatives and Relational Contract Theory 
 
This essay opened by explaining the mismatch between the challenges in the urban 
core and the solutions typically proposed to address those challenges. Linking the 
mismatch to historic practices of race and class discrimination, this essay promotes the idea 
of private agreement as a means for creating large-scale social change in the urban core. 
More specifically, this essay seeks to counter the mismatches by presenting the potential 
of written relational collective impact agreements to address the urgency of poverty. In 
other scholarship, I have discussed the value of voluntary agreement.86 Here, in particular, 
the value of agreement between parties committed to social change can be striking when 
compared to the social and economic gaps created by government failures in mismatched 
responses to urban poverty. Transactional practice seeks value creation for all the parties 
                                                        
82 This essay argues for the value of a written agreement to effectuate collective impact initiatives.  While 
courts generally treat “agreements to agree” as unenforceable, there are a number of legal scholars who 
have suggested this distinction between a contract and negotiations preceding contract formation is overly 
formalistic and should be reconsidered. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict 
Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 871 (2001) (citing Ian R. Macneil, A Primer of Contract Planning, 
48 S. CAL. L. REV. 627 (1975)). 
83 Id. 
84 Crowder, supra note 22, at 654. 
85 Id. at 637. 
86 See id. 
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to a transaction,87 collective impact is the latest iteration of transactional advocacy in the 
public interest.   
Before collective impact initiatives, transactional efforts at social change occurred 
through transactions such as memorandums of understanding (MOUs), the creation of 
social enterprise structures, or by engaging in the most well-known space for transactions 
for the public good, and community economic development (CED).88 While each of these 
types of “public good transactions” assist underserved communities in the urban core, each 
also has certain limitations that work against its ability to promote large-scale social change 
through impact transaction. 
 Nonprofit organizations and public sector agencies regularly use MOUs to 
memorialize their strategic partnerships.89  MOUs, however, are typically nonbinding 
agreements that document the parties’ aspirational goals without identifying specific rights 
and obligations of the parties or outcomes.90 Similarly, the majority of social enterprises 
are generally either for-profit businesses that pursue “the methods and disciplines of 
business and the power of the marketplace to advance their social, environmental and 
human justice agendas”91 or nonprofit corporations undertaking revenue generating 
business.92 The pursuit of social change through social enterprise is growing in popularity 
in terms of both increasing numbers of social enterprise start-ups and consumers seeking 
to support social enterprises with their dollars.93 While consistently making significant 
interventions in their chosen social fields, as independent and unrelated entities, social 
enterprises are ill-suited for promoting large-scale social change through collaborative 
efforts as impact transaction. The social enterprise “movement” facilitates the formation 
and operation of individual entities. Any collaboration among social enterprises is focused 
on the growth of the industry through regulatory reform and other operational concerns, 
not forming cross-sector partnerships focused on systemic social change.94 Lastly, CED is 
both a type of legal practice and a social movement that has been deployed in underserved 
communities for decades.95 CED projects originated to promote community-based 
economic opportunity in underserved communities through the deployment of different 
types of transactions, such as community benefits agreements (“CBAs”).96 CBAs are 
private contracts between developers and community groups by which a community 
(usually through a community association or nonprofit organization) agrees to support a 
local development project in exchange for certain benefits that should meet the needs of 
the local community, such as workforce development and local hiring preferences for 
                                                        
87 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost Engineers (Aug. 1997). 
88 Colorado Collaboration Award, Collaboration Toolkit: Creating an MOU, 2013, 
http://anschutzfamilyfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MOU-toolkit-MAIN.pdf. 
89See Written Agreements, PROJECT FOR PUB. SPACES (Dec. 31, 2008), https://www.pps.org/article/pppp-
chapter4. 
90 See, e.g., id.  
91 Mark Jordhal, What Is a Social Enterprise?, BEAD FOR LIFE (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://www.beadforlife.org/blog/what-is-a-social-enterprise/ [[https://perma.cc/L4RU-A75S;]; see also 
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013). 
92Jordhal, supra note 91. 
93 Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 257, 257 (2009).   
94 Id. at 265. 
95 Id. at 258. 
96 Id. at 261. 
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community residents.97 Despite many significant successes throughout the decades, the 
suitability of CED, generally, and CBAs, specifically, as tools for the type of large-scale 
social change contemplated by impact transaction, is unsettled. The reasons for this include 
the ever-present question about the identity of the “community” to be involved in decision-
making as well as the idea that CED theories may limit CED’s impact to local 
neighborhood projects to the exclusion of the possibility of large-scale social change 
collective impact initiatives, and impact transaction, are designed to promote.98      
The benefits of these public good transactions are unquestioned by this essay. Like 
MOUs, social enterprises, and CED transactions, collective impact is a public good 
transaction, and impact transaction is not presented to eradicate the need for other public 
good transactions (either those currently in existence or those waiting to be discovered). 
This essay’s suggestion that these types of public good transactions do not directly advance 
impact transaction (i.e. large-scale social change) is not an argument against their 
effectiveness, but recognition that comprehensive large-scale social change in the urban 
core through impact transaction may be  best accomplished through the use of private 
written collective impact agreements that are grounded in relational contract principles. 
Where CED is inherently local, collective impact agreements can be regional in scope.99 
Where the social enterprise movement is focused on the efforts of individual entities, as 
explained later,100 collective impact agreements can be the umbrella under which multiple 
entities work together to advance impact transaction. Where MOUs are an outdated 
approach to contracting for the public good, collective impact agreements drafted using 
relational contract theory can properly set the parties’ expectations for both performance 
and nonperformance under the agreement.    
There is inherent value in both contract and an informed process for contracting. 
Parties enter contracts looking for predictability, risk allocation, and reliability,101 and 
contracts bring order to transactions by creating frameworks for the parties to transact 
through. Irrespective of discipline, most contracts exhibit five common elements: (1) 
cooperation; (2) exchange; (3) mutual planning for the future; (4) potential sanctions; and 
(5) social control and social manipulation.102 Contract law, however, is not static. While 
the elements of most fundamental contract law principles have remained the same since 
first articulated (think offer, acceptance, and consideration as the elements for formation 
of a contract), individual concepts do evolve over time to reflect current industry practices, 
regulatory schemes, legal developments, and new technologies (think of the evolution of 
the concept of consideration as a necessity for formation, evolving from a significant 
                                                        
97 See, e.g., Sandy Gerber, Community Benefits Agreements: A Tool for More Equitable Development?, 
FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 1, 2007), https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-
dividend/community-benefits-agreements-a-tool-for-more-equitable-development.  
98 See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic Development and the Case for 
Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 144–45 (2004). 
99 Focusing on “cradle to career” programing in urban schools in Cincinnati, suburbs in Ohio, and Northern 
Kentucky, StrivePartnership is one of the first and most renowned regional collective impact initiatives.  
See Collective Impact, STRIVETOGETHER, https://www.strivetogether.org/our-approach/collective-impact/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
100 See infra notes 106 – 119 and accompanying text discussing relational contract’s ability to consider both 
“corporate and social” agendas as indicative of collective impact’s ability to have agreements with similar 
scopes.    
101Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 692 (2005). 
102 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 808-09 (1974) 
(arguing “status, social role, kinship” and other “internalizations” play a role in contract and discussing the 
role of the social matrix in contract).   
Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice    [Vol. 8:1 2019] 
 
14 
concrete deliverable to the requirement of a “mere peppercorn”). In addition to evolving 
contractual concepts, different types of contracts emerge to accommodate specific 
industries and types of parties. For example, e-contracts accommodate virtual exchanges 
between parties to contracts for new types of services such as shared rides and other 
services stemming from the “gig economy.” New forms of contracting follow societal 
trends and innovations. Given the increasing diversity of contracting needs, contract law 
scholars consistently consider what new mechanisms will “accommodate [the] new world 
of transactions.”103 Collective impact is a new type of transaction, and relational contract 
theory is the contract law mechanism best suited to accommodate this new transaction.            
The evolution of contract law as a discipline is separated into the development of 
classical and modern contract law theories. Classical legal analysis holds that the definitive 
contract is an isolated discrete exchange between strangers in a market where the parties 
are able to “at minimal cost . . . allocate explicitly the risks that future contingencies may 
cause one or the other to regret having entered into an executory agreement.”104 Modern 
contract law, in contrast, holds that formation of a contract may be a dynamic, evolving 
process, rather than a process located at a fixed moment in time.105 Relational contract 
theory is, arguably, modern contract law’s most significant contribution to contract law 
theory.106 Lacking a singular definition, relational contracts are typically described as 
contracts where “the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement 
to well-defined obligations”107 and where “[s]uch definitive obligations may be impractical 
because of inability to identity uncertain future conditions or because of inability to 
characterize complex adaptions adequately even when the contingencies themselves can 
be identified in advance.”108 Another definition describes a relational contract as “[a] 
legally enforceable written contract establishing a commercial partnership within a flexible 
contractual framework based on social norms and jointly defined objectives, prioritizing a 
relationship with continuous alignment of interests before the commercial transactions.”109 
Relational contracts govern both the substance of the transaction (i.e. what is being 
exchanged among the parties) as well as the frameworks for how those exchanges are to 
occur over time. There are two main approaches to consider in the creation of a relational 
contract: the substance of what is being exchanged (i.e. the goods and/or services being 
exchanged) and the types of provisions and mechanisms included in the agreement to 
govern the exchange. Hallmarks guiding how to approach drafting a relational contract (i.e. 
the goals for the contract) include focus on the relationship, not just the deal to be 
transacted; establishing partnerships instead of an arms-length relationships; embedding 
social norms in the relationship; avoiding and mitigating risk by alignment of interests; and 
                                                        
103 Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, supra note 101, at 698.   
104 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1089–90 
(1981).  This narrow conception of contract law led Grant Gilmore to write The Death of Contract in which 
he argued that all contracts are individual and discrete interactions and that, as such, there was little value 
in continuing to teach contract law as a doctrinal course in the law school curriculum because there was no 
comprehensive theory of contract law to teach to students. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 
(1st ed. 1974). 
105 Id. at 1095–96.  
106 See Richard Austen-Baker, A Relational Law of Contract?, 20 J. CONT. L. 125 (2004).   
107 Goetz & Scott, supra note 104, at 1091. 
108 Id. 
109 David Frydlinger et al., Unpacking Relational Contracts: The Practitioner’s Go-To Guide for 
Understanding Relational Contracts, U. OF TENN. C. OF BUS., at 5.   
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creating fair and flexible framework in which to execute the relational contract.110 
Hallmarks of types of provisions included in relational contracts include indefiniteness in 
duration; informality; incompleteness;111 impreciseness with performance standards; 
intentionality about identifying roles for social norms and social control; representation of 
industry standards;112 and tolerance of gaps in risk allocation. Each of these hallmarks is 
also a collective impact value,113 which further underscores the appropriateness of 
relational contract theory to execute collective impact agreements. For the purposes of 
contemplating use of collective impact agreements to counter urban poverty, this essay 
focuses on three of the most significant common themes between the hallmarks of 
relational contract theory and the collective impact framework: (i) the importance of the 
relationship among the parties; (ii) the role of social norms and social capital; and (iii) 
incompleteness of contact.        
As relational contracts steer incomplete, long-term relationships,114 the importance 
of the context of those relationships is supreme. Relational contract theory recognizes that 
“relationships are not just person to person, but also organization to organization.”115 The 
importance of the underlying relationships among the parties broadens the scope of the 
traditional contract to include “the framework for the relationship—the forums, behaviors 
and mechanisms within which interactions will occur.”116 The scope of relational contracts 
exceeds beyond the goods or services being exchanged to include governing the 
mechanisms in the relationships designed to “not only foster mutual trust, but also facilitate 
the sharing of knowledge and information to generate innovation and value for the parties 
to the relationship.”117 Considering this scope, it is not surprising that “[a] key goal of 
relational contract is to create a continuous alignment of interests throughout the contract 
term,”118 meaning that “the influential elements of  relational contracting that assume 
greater significance are co-operation and dependency.” 119   
The construction industry is the paradigmatic example of relational contract 
because construction contracts typically involve long-term projects with multiple parties, 
such as property owners, general contractors, subcontractors, architects, and engineers. 
These projects generally are completed in phases, with many projects remaining 
incomplete until other phases are first completed. A fundamental principle in construction 
is that the primary function of a construction contract “is not to predict or control all 
contingencies that may arise in the future but to create a workable framework for managing 
successful relationships.”120 In construction, relationships are paramount, and 
                                                        
110 Id. at 21.  
111 See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 852, 862 
(2000).  
112 But see Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 662 (2010) (discussing the 
importance of applying “loose standards [rather] than formalistic rules” to relational contracts). 
113 See Kania et. al, supra note 28, at 2 (discussing the five hallmarks of collective impact).  
114 Morten Hviid, Long Term Contracts and Relational Contracts, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 46, 58 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)  
115 Frydlinger et al., supra note 109, at 4.  
116 Id.  
117 Barbara Colledge, Relational Contracting – Creating Value Beyond the Project, 2 LEAN CONSTRUCTION 
J. 30, 32 (2005).   
118 Id. at 20.  
119 “This greater connectivity between the various professions and stakeholders, greater partnership 
working, greater sharing of knowledge and ideas or knowledge capital and greater capacity for creativity, to 
identify creative, effective solutions is a feature of relational approaches.” Id. at 39.  
120 Frydlinger et al., supra note 109, at 20.  
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“[e]xperienced owners and contractors, and their seasoned lawyers, often observe that a 
project’s success depends more on establishing and managing the relationships between 
the participants than on the contracts they execute.”121 The concept of relationality is so 
inherent in the construction industry that it is embedded in the industry’s standard form 
documents, which are largely produced by industry trade associations.122 The construction 
industry’s respect for and use of relational contracts is the right model for collective impact 
practitioners,123  because relationships also drive collective impact agreements.124   
To manage the scopes of the relationships among the parties to a transaction, 
relational contracts incorporate rules for the development and operation of social norms. A 
signature characteristic of rational contracts is the institution of social norms as an 
enforcement mechanism.125 Relational contract theory is an ideal framework for collective 
impact because relational contract theory allows for the creation of social norms to govern 
both commercial and social transactions, and collective impact initiatives have both 
commercial and social contexts.126 The construction industry standards discussed earlier 
are an example of commercial implications of relational contract theory.127 The social 
implications of relational contract theory manifest as both the real impact that relational 
contracts can actually have on the ground in communities and the types of social norms 
that may be memorialized in relational contracts to sustain the relationships among the 
parties.128 Relational contracts can be a tool for community development working against 
urban poverty where the “alignment of both the commercial and social corporate agendas 
. . . is important in the creation of sustainable communities.”129 When employed in a public 
interest context, relational contracts can strengthen the social capital of those suffering 
from poverty in the urban core.130 “[S]social capital refers to connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
from them.”131  “[P]arties [to relational contracts]. . . have learned to behave under two sets 
of rules: a strict set of rules for legal enforcement and a more flexible set of rules for social 
enforcement.”132 The notion of working together through agreement to continuously align 
the interests of the multiple parties to a relational contract in the pursuit of a common 
agenda completely mirrors the collective impact framework. For example, the 
comprehensive  planning processes discussed previously133 fosters the social norm of trust 
and creates  important decision-making mechanisms such as frameworks for dispute 
                                                        
121 Carl J. Circo, The Evolving Role of Relational Contract in Construction Law, 32 CONSTRUCTION L. 16, 
16 (2012).   
122 See id 
123 See Colledge supra note 117, at 34.  
124 See id. at 31. 
125 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725–28 (2001).  
126 See id. 
127 The construction industry’s adoption of relational contract theory is an example of the commercial 
application.  See id. at 32.  
128 See id. at 34. 
129 Id.at 33. 
130 “The adoption of relational contracting approaches can make a significant contribution to the 
development of sustainable communities through the building of “social capital.”  Id. at 31.  
131 Colledge, supra note 117, at 34 (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000)).  
132 Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
597, 615 (1990). 
133 See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 102. 
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resolution.134 Examples of other social norms for managing relational contracts include 
communication; problem-solving; establishing and fostering “no-blame” culture; creating 
mechanisms to foster “joint working” among the parties; establishing and being clear about 
mutual objectives; and developing benchmarks for performance measurements and 
monitoring for continuous improvements.135 These guiding principles are almost identical, 
conceptually, to the five hallmarks of collective impact.136 Relational contract theory social 
norms are developed and best implemented from the parties’ “dedication to the philosophy 
of collective work, commitment to the common agenda, and willingness to leave … ego at 
the door.”137 Members of collective impact networks are bound by a shared desire for large-
scale social change and an abiding trust in the collective impact process.138 
 Every contract is partially unplanned139 and incomplete. While relational contracts 
are, by definition, incomplete, that “incompleteness” does not mean relational contracts are 
substantively flawed.140 Incomplete contracts are “[l]ess-complete contracts that rely on 
trust and reciprocity rather than control.”141 Parties enter incomplete contracts for 
numerous strategic reasons. 142 Two of the most common of these are (i) potential high 
transaction costs are difficult to estimate in light of an unknown or unpredictable future, 
and (ii) asymmetric information between the parties that one or both parties is unwilling to 
                                                        
134 “The termination of relational contracts engenders closer scrutiny. The duty to adjust or renegotiate, 
along with the norms of good faith and fair dealing, play more important roles, often non-legally induced.”. 
DiMatteo & Morant, supra note 70, at 562 (2010) (citing Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of 
Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 265, 317-19 (1999)) (discussing the norms of good faith and fair dealing in contract law).  
135 See, e.g., JIM BERGMAN ET AL., UNPACKING RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE PRACTITIONER’S GO-TO 
GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 5–6, 44 (2016). While relational contract is not a 
new legal theory, it is an emerging field of interdisciplinary and international study as a business practice 
with research and scholarship coming from non-law other types of academics, practicing attorneys, and 
industry experts. 
An Australian case study, FFG Enterprise, was recognized as one of the world’s best practice in relational 
contracting and collaboration. The case study’s authors identified the following lessons for successful 
relational contracting:    
• A charter is a powerful tool 
• The roadmap (unpacking relational contracts) already exists;   
• Leadership is essential; 
• Create a shared belief; 
• Build trust; 
• Culture is a key enabler;  
• Contracts are a tool, not a weapon;  
• Co-location is an operational multiplier; and  
• Continues improvement is indeed continuous;  
KATE VITASEK ET AL., THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY FFG ENTERPRISE: A JOURNEY FROM ANTAGONISM 
TO HIGH PERFORMING RELATIONSHIP 2-5 (2018). 
136 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30, at 38. 
137 Kim Fortunato, When and How To Engage the Private Sector in Collective Impact, COLLECTIVE IMPACT 
(July 14, 2015 9:21 PM), http://collectiveimpactforum.org/blogs/9406/when-and-how-engage-private-
sector-collective-impact. 
138 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30.  
139 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 731.     
140 See Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 299-01 
(2014). 
141 See id. at 300. 
142 See id. at 305–06. 
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share.143    
 While “incompleteness” is imbedded in the definition of relational contract, the 
label is also particularly true for collective impact initiatives. The counter to 
“incompleteness” is planning. Typically, planning around a discrete contract involves 
determining (1)  the parties’ goals, (2) the costs associated with those goals, and (3) the 
methods for achieving those goals, including timelines.144 “Parties to a relational contract 
. . . are likely to view the exchange as an ongoing integration of behavior which will grow 
and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future.”145 Planning is fundamental to the 
execution of relational contracts. 146 There is a distinction, however, between performance 
planning and risk planning.147 Performance planning contemplates what tasks each party 
must perform, the timeline by when the parties must perform these tasks, and the 
appropriate performance standards.148 Relational contract theory’s willingness to tolerate 
risk is not synonymous with not planning for risk.149 Planning for risk allocation 
contemplates the positions of each party and which is best situated to minimize or 
withstand the risks in the transaction.150 In collective impact, planning dominates all other 
activities, as ongoing negotiated brainstorming occurs among the parties about the 
initiative.151  Collective impact is a relational phenomenon that requires expression in 
written collective impact agreements to reach its full potential.152 
The idea of a tailored written agreement is not alien to practitioners of relational 
contract theory.153 The argument for a written collective impact agreement may seem in 
opposition to the culture of trust that is fundamental to the core, formation, and 
sustainability of collective impact initiatives.154 There are, however, methods for 
approaching a collective impact contracting process that reflect the core values of 
collective impact.155 As advocates of written agreements have noted, “using a formal 
process at the start of the contracting process” can “ensure organizations and individuals 
feel there has been a fair process for establishing the contract.”156 In addition, although 
collective impact initiatives are built around a common agenda, it is important to note that 
participants are also motivated by their own organizational self-interests and a written 
                                                        
143 See Scott, supra note 111, at 862-63. 
144 See Allen Grossman et al., StriveTogether: Reinventing the Local Education Ecosystem, HARV. BUS. 
SCH. 5, 5 (2014). 
145 Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 281 (2006) (quoting Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and 
Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (2000)).   
146 “Relational contract theorists can win over adherents if contracts can be usefully mapped and ordered 
based on their relational elements . . . .” Leib, supra note 112, at 661.   
147 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 761. Planning an exit strategy from the transaction is equally important.  
148 See id. 
149 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 729. 
150 See Scott, supra note 132, at 602.   
151 See id., at 615. 
152 See generally Kania & Kramer, supra note 30. 
153 “Relational contract theorists can win over adherents if contracts can be usefully mapped and ordered 
based on their relational elements[.]” See Leib, supra note 112, at 661.  This “mapping” and “ordering” can 
only occur in a written agreement.   
154 See generally id. at 675-76 (“Most often, parties simply cannot allocate risks of their mutual endeavor 
at the start of a relationship because so much is uncertain, and so much trust-building is necessary to get the 
relationship off the ground. Indeed, the very incompleteness of the deal between the parties is central in 
defining what counts as a relational contract[.]”).  
155 See BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 14. 
156 Id. at 20. 
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agreement would, ideally, protect both the achievement of the common agenda as well as 
the interests of each individual participant by preserving each participant’s preferences and 
expectations. A written agreement would also memorialize the flexibility desired for 
navigating these ongoing long-term relationships and the work required to address adaptive 
social problems.157 Collective impact transactions need written form agreements to better 
reflect the intent of each collective impact initiative and because the contract frameworks 
will enhance implementation of collective impact methods.158  
Another reason in support of written collective impact agreements is that the forms 
of contract used to date for collective impact agreements are a collection of form types that 
are ill-structured for maximizing collective impact outcomes and, thus, impact 
transaction.159 Unlike with the construction industry, there are no standard form agreements 
in collective impact.160 Most collective impact initiatives are papered with MOUs, 
partnership agreements, or grant agreements. While document titles alone are far from 
demonstrative of the substance of an agreement, there are significant reasons why each of 
these types of documents is ill-suited for collective impact initiatives.   
As previously explained,161 the majority of MOUs are nonbinding agreements.  
Collective impact initiatives are best served by binding written agreements.162 This essay 
does not make this suggestion lightly. While the organizational parties to collective impact 
agreements can be easily identified, there are myriad intriguing foundational challenges to 
resolve in order to widely implement these binding written agreements into collective 
impact practice. These challenges include (i) drafting around the power differentials among 
the organizational parties, (ii) accounting for appropriate critiques concerning the negative 
consequences of formality on disenfranchised groups, and (iii) appropriate sanctions for 
breach. In addition to these challenges, while this essay advocates for the use of private 
agreement, it recognizes that many of the social ills awaiting large-scale social change 
involve significant government interventions that will have to be considered (i.e. what is 
the role of government in collective impact with either the individual organizational 
members (e.g. as a grant provider or other type of partner) or as a barrier to systemic 
change).163 An equally important question is how lawyers who work in any capacity on 
collective impact initiatives can be better trained to assist with these projects—again, the 
construction industry serves as important precedent here.164  
 Standard grant agreements are also problematic. Where collective impact 
agreements are based on the initial grant agreement between the funder and the backbone 
agency, there could be significant concerns about whether there is privity of contract 
between the funder and the non-backbone participants who are party to the collective 
                                                        
157 See Davidson, supra note 145, at 289, 300. 
158 Cf. id. at 296. 
159 This essay does not present empirical evidence of this fact, but a quick Google search should satisfy any 
readers’ curiosity about the assertion. See generally Steering Committee Governance Agreement, 
COLLECTIVE IMPACT FORUM, https://collectiveimpactforum.org/resources/steering-committee-governance-
agreement. 
160 Cf. Scott, supra note 132, at 869.   
161 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing MOUs as public good transactions).  
162 See supra pp. 29-30 and notes 154–58. 
163 See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 145, at 299-300. 
164 See Circo, supra note 121, at 22. 
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impact initiative.165 There would be questions about the existence of privity of contract 
among the other organizational participants in the collective impact initiative.    
Partnership agreements are another type of form agreement misapplied to collective 
impact initiatives.166 While it is clear that collective impact participants view their 
involvement in collective impact initiatives as nonbusiness but strategic partnerships, form 
partnership agreements are an inappropriate form for collective impact initiatives. Unlike 
MOUs and grant agreements, partnership agreements are not agreements for an exchange 
of services, but memorialize the legal obligations of partners who want to work in concert 
together in a for-profit venture purpose for their pecuniary gain.167 The partners’ ownership 
interests, levels of liability, governance rights, and partnership agreements are governed by 
the default rules in individual state statutes. Again, naming a document a “partnership 
agreement” in the absence of any language that indicates that the parties want to form a 
partnership, will not automatically create a legal partnership. However, how effective will 
the collective impact model be for establishing replicable models for large-scale social 
change if its foundations are built on the use of inappropriate and, thus, potentially 
ineffective, documents? 
  In addition to accounting for the uniqueness of the collective impact infrastructure 
framework in written agreement, there are two important drafting considerations that will 
impact the drafting of collective impact agreements: (1) the number of parties to the 
contract, and (2) the substance of the contract (what is being contracted for).168 Collective 
impact agreements are service contracts, meaning agreements for the exchange of services 
as opposed to the sale of goods.169 Collective impact agreements are multilateral (multi-
party) service agreements among cross-sector participants with diverse skill sets that are 
designed to affect a large-scale social change of an adaptive problem through synchronized 
and phased service delivery coordinated through long-term ongoing planning.170 While 
contracts for services are inherently more relational than contracts for the sale of goods,171 
multilateral agreements do require special drafting considerations, such as establishing 
                                                        
165 See Davidson, supra note 145, at 292 (citing Clenega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1242 
(Fed. Circ. 1998)). 
166 But see BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 21.  
167 In early writings, Ian Macneil emphasized that humans desire both “solidarity and reciprocity,” thus 
instilling a tendency to prefer relational contracts because a relational contract (1) can entail elements of 
discrete transactions enhancing independence and embodying choice; and (2) relational business dealings 
are more valuable for immediate and long-term monetary and social success than most pure discrete 
contracts with a stranger. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors 
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274 (1987) [hereinafter 
Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology]. Further, Macneil focused on trade relationships and 
trade partnerships as examples of “social solidarity” where individuals can have a heightened sense of trust 
validated through “specialized reciprocity.” Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and 
Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 569-70 (1986).) [herinafter Macneil, Exchange Revisited].). Macneil 
focused on trading partnerships at very intricate and very low levels as examples of how humans have a 
penchant for relational contracts that are “ubiquitous as long as those relations continue.” Macneil, 
Relational Contract Theory as Sociology, supra note 167, at 284. Partnerships require engaging in “some 
give and take of information—a give which constitutes a form of mutual planning.” Macneil, The Many 
Futures of Contracts, supra note 102, at 770.  
168 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 758, 792. 
169 See Kania & Kramer, supra note 30. 
170 See Crowder, supra note 22, at 623. 
171 See id. at 694. 
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privity of contract among the appropriate parties.172     
Other drafting concerns include the most effective way to enforce relational 
contracts173 – this would be true for collective impact agreements too. True to the 
preventative nature of transactional practice and the collaborative nature of relational 
contracts in general, and collective impact in particular, approaches to enforcement do not 
have to focus on what occurs if a party breaches, but can, instead, focus on what parties 
would need to avoid breaching.174  Drafters can accomplish this by creating innovative 
default rules for the collaborative that are based on linkages between legal rules and 
underlying social norms.175 Default rules are typically perceived as “gap fillers” for 
incompleteness in a contract.176 In addition, “the default rules of contract law reveal a clear 
preference for . . . clear, categorical assignments of risk.”177 Default rules are applicable to 
drafting both operational provisions such as performance standards and boilerplate 
provisions such as assignment provisions.178 Looking at collective impact case studies, 
drafters can learn where “defaults” have occurred and, using such empirical data, draft 
default rules that, for example, focus on what type of support the collective impact initiative 
is required to offer members in threat of default to prevent default as opposed to only 
sanctions for default.179   
Moving beyond default rules, a well drafted collective impact agreement will 
document “‘shared accountability and differentiated responsibility’ among stakeholders” 
where “[e]ach stakeholder ha[s] ‘a defined role in achieving a shared vision of improved 
outcomes.’”180 Currently, however, collective impact agreements, if drafted at all, are 
drafted as largely aspirational and the agreements are not typically structured to identify 
which parties are responsible for what deliverables at any particular phase of the 
initiative—an outcome counter to certain fundamentals of contract law.181 “To be clear, 
clauses about audit rights, indemnification, limitation of liability, termination for 
convenience etc. are not as such in breach of [relational contract and collective impact] 
principles.” 182 Relational contracts can and should accommodate standard contract 
provisions to help ensure the effectiveness of the contract, “[b]ut the intent and wording 
must be fair and balanced, aligning to the guiding principles.” 183  
                                                        
172 See, e.g., Bryce Johnson, Efficiency Concerns in Breach of Multilateral Contracts, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1513, 1516 (1997). 
173 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 104, at 1115-16. 
174 Id. at 1092. 
175 Scott, supra note 132, at 600. 
176 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1546 (2016).  
177 Scott, supra note 132, at 606.  
178 See id. at 598.  (“The principal task of the law of commercial contracts is to set default rules for 
commercial actors and other repeat players who, presumably, are quite capable of bargaining for 
customized alternatives”). 
179 These default rules would have to be more substantive that just offering a “cure period” for curing a 
default.  See id. at 602–06. 
180 See Grossman et al., supra note 144, at 4 (citing Strive Network, Commitment to Quality Benchmarks 
for Building Civic Infrastructure, STRIVE NETWORK, 
www.strivenetwork.org/sites/default/files/images/Committment%20to%20Quality_0.pdf (last visited 
October 2013)). 
181 See Macneil, supra note 102, at 712-13 (stating that a contract is “the projection of exchange into the 
future”). 
182 BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 135, at 35.  
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 In addition to the benefit of efficiency that would come from the uniformity in 
collective impact practice with the creation of a written form collective impact agreement, 
there are public policy reasons that support this suggestion. Although collective impact 
initiatives are generally private law transactions, collective impact initiatives exist to 
produce large-scale social change for the public good.184 As such, collective impact 
agreements are contracts for the public interest, and the public would be harmed in some 
way if a collective impact initiative failed.  While this may seem to be limited to 
unrecoverable reliance damages, the idea that there could be any potential harm to 
underserved communities warrants the use of a written form agreement specifically tailored 
to the collective impact framework.185 Resident’s in poor urban communities should not 
suffer harm because of an initiative’s failure to execute a well-structured agreement.186 
 
CONCLUSION 
 As a strategy for combatting urban poverty, impact transaction through relational 
contract seeks to address the lack of hope present in Marvin Gaye’s lyrics at the beginning 
of this essay.  Urban poverty is thriving, and, in many respects, always has.  Where past 
programs and initiatives have failed, collective impact provides not only frameworks for 
written agreement, but, also, fundamentally, a framework for hope.   
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